Secured password authentication and update of passwords are two essential requirements for remote login over unreliable networks. In this paper, an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) based technique has been proposed that not only satisfies the above two requirements, but also provides additional security requirements that are not available in some schemes proposed so far. For instances, the Peyravian and Zunic's scheme does not provide the protection against the password guessing attack, server spoofing attack and data eavesdropping attack. Although some modifications to remove these attacks have been proposed by Hwang and Yeh, Lee et al., it has been found that some attacks like replay attack, server spoofing attack, data eavesdropping attack, etc. are still possible. Subsequently, Hwang and Yeh's scheme is further improved by Lin and Hwang, which has been analyzed in this paper and certain security flaws have been identified. We have attempted to remove these security flaws and proposed an ECC-based scheme that in addition to the secured password authentication and password update, it protects several related attacks efficiently. As a proof of our claim, the detailed security analysis of the proposed scheme against the attacks has been given. One advantage of the proposed scheme is that it generates an ECC-based common secret key that can be used for symmetric encryption, which requires lesser processing time than the time required in the public key encryption-based techniques.
Introduction
Client authentication needs security for remote login while the client's program tries to communicate with the server's program over insecure networks like Internet. The identity and a secret password of a client are used for mutual authentication and access control; password can be compromised during transmission, if an efficient scheme is not followed. Also some systems in a hostile network needs change of the client's password periodically for the protection of the valuable resources from adversary, and until a secured password change protocol that allows the client to change the old password to a new password safely, the systems are not well protected. Basically there are four basic approaches based on public key encryption, private key encryption, hash function and their combinations, to design password authentication and password change scheme.
Lamport [1] suggested a hash-based password authentication scheme that mutually authenticates the client and the server successfully, although it is immune from server's data eavesdropping and impersonation attacks, but vulnerable to reply attack, also its high hash computation and password resetting problem decreases its applicability for practical use. The password authentication and password change protocols using only collision-resistant one-way hash function without
Preliminaries
The elliptic curve cryptosystem [30] was initially proposed by Koblitz [31] and Miller [32] in 1985 to design public key cryptosystem and presently it has turned out to be an integral part of the modern cryptography. The security of the ECC lies on the difficulty of solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP), and it can achieve same security as of RSA with the key of fewer bits [30] . An overview of ECC, computational problem on it and the bilinear pairings are given below.
Theory of elliptic curve
The equation of a non-singular elliptic curve E q (a, b) over a finite field Z q (q > 3 and is a large prime number) can be written as 
where a and b are two constant such that 4a 3 + 27b 3 ̸ = 0 mod q must be satisfied for its non-singularity. Any point P(x, y) ∈ E q (a, b), x, y ∈ Z q together with O, called 'point at infinity' forms an additive cyclic group E = {(x, y) ∈ E q (a, b)} ∪ {O},
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) -3 where O serves as additive identity element of the group. The point multiplication is computed by repeated addition as, k · P = k times    P + P · · · + P. A more details of elliptic curve group properties can be found in [30] .
Computational problems

Definition 1 (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
). Given Q , R ∈ E, find an integer k ∈ Z * q such that R = kQ .
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP)
). Given (P, aP, bP) for any a, b ∈ Z * q , computation of abP is hard to the group E.
Definition 3 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP)
). Given (P, aP, bP, cP) for any a, b, c ∈ Z * q , decide whether or not cP = abP, i.e. decide c = ab mod q or not.
Bilinear pairings
Let G 1 denotes an additive group of prime order q, G 2 is a multiplicative group of the same order and P is a generator of
is an admissible mapping, which satisfies the following properties.
• Bilinearity: For any P, Q , R ∈ G 1 then we haveê(
Therefore, for any and
• Non-degenerate:ê(P, P) ̸ = 1 G 2 , where 1 G 2 is the identity element of the group G 2 .
• Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to computeê(P, Q ) for any P, Q ∈ G 1 .
In general, G 1 is group of points on an elliptic curve, and G 2 is a multiplicative subgroup of a finite field. The mapê will be derived either from the modified Weil pairing or Tate pairing over a finite field. For more comprehensive description about bilinear pairings, selection of suitable parameters, elliptic curves and these groups can be found in [33] [34] [35] for efficiency and security.
Review of Lin and Hwang's scheme
In this section, a brief description of the Lin and Hwang [9] scheme that contains three parts: password authentication, password change and key distribution, are given below, where the following notations have been used (Table 1) . Now the Lin and Hwang's scheme for password authentication, password change and distribution of secure session key are given below.
Password authentication protocol
It consists of the following steps:
Step 1. Client → Server: id, {r c , pw}K s .
Step 2. Server → Client: r c ⊕ r s , H(r s ).
Step 3. Client → Server: id, H(r c , r s ).
Step 4. Server → Client: Access Granted/Denied.
In brief, the server stores H(pw) instead of pw, to protect the password. During the password authentication, a client selects a random number r c and encrypts r c and pw with server's public key K S and sends the same with client's id to the server as shown in step 1. The server decrypts {r c , pw}K s using its own private key and retrieves r c and pw, then compares hashed result of extracted pw with H(pw), which stored in the server's database. If the result is matched then the server selects a random number r s , computes r c ⊕ r s and H(r s ) and sends back r c ⊕ r s and H(r s ) to the client. After receiving r c ⊕ r s , H(r s ) from the server, the client XORed r c with r c ⊕ r s and retrieves r s . The client compares if the hashed value of retrieved r s and received H(r s ), depending on this condition client computes the authentication token H(r c , r s ) and sends back id, H(r c , r s ) to the server. Therefore, the server computes H(r c , r s ) using its own copies of r s and r c and compares with received H(r c , r s ). If it is matched then the server sends a message 'Access granted' otherwise send an error message 'Access Denied' to the client.
Password change protocol
The four steps of this protocol are given below:
Step Step 4. Server → Client: Access Granted/Denied. 
Bases point of the elliptic curve group of order n such that n · G = O, where n is a large prime number
H(•)
A collision-resistant one-way secure hash function 
Key distribution protocol
Let G is a finite cyclic group and g be the generator of order q, where q a large prime number. Let x, y are two elements of Z * q chosen by client and server respectively and kept them secret for a session. The values of G, g, q and Z * q are made public. The key distribution protocol is given below.
Step
The common secret session key is then computed by the client and the server as (g x ) y and (g y )
x respectively.
Weaknesses of Lin and Hwang's scheme
The cryptanalysis of the Lin and Hwang's scheme [9] has been made in this section, and some of the common weaknesses are given below.
Stolen-verifier attack
The stolen-verifier attack, which is described in [6, 13] , means that an outsider theft the password-verifier from the server's database and applies an off-line guessing attack on it to get the client's exact password and hence, he can impersonate as a legitimate client. In Lin-Hwang's scheme [9] , the client C registers to the remote server S with id, H(pw) and S then stores the pair (id, H(pw)) to the database. The outsider A can successfully find out the C 's password pw by performing the following procedure.
Step 1. A steals H(pw) from the S's database and tries to find out C 's password pw by using an off-line password guessing attack on stolen H(pw Step 3. If H(pw It is known that a client generally chooses the weak password (low intensity) for easy memorization, so the space |PW | is not large enough.
Therefore, the stolen-verifier attack is possible in Lin-Hwang's scheme. The stolen-verifier attack in Lin-Hwang's scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Insider attack
In insider attack as stated in [36, 37] , a client C may register with a number of servers S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n using a common password pw and the identity id for his convenience, and if the privileged-insider U 1 of S 1 has the knowledge of C 's pw and id, then U 1 may try to access other servers S 2 , S 3 , . . . , S n by using the same pw and id. In Lin-Hwang's scheme [9] , initially the remote server stores the pair (id, H(pw)) of the client C to the database. Thus the insider attack in Lin-Hwang's scheme may be done by using the following three steps:
Step 1. U 1 steals the password-verifier H(pw) from the S 1 's database.
Step 2. C chooses an easy-memorable password and therefore, it is not difficult for U 1 to figure out C 's password pw from H(pw) by executing an off-line password guessing attack.
Step 3. U 1 tries to use C 's identity-password pair (id, pw), follows the password authentication protocol of Lin-Hwang's scheme and can easily login to the other remote servers S 2 , S 3 , . . . , S n .
The detailed description of this attack is given in the Fig. 2. 
Impersonation attack
According to the impersonation attack in [7, 13] , it is found that Lin and Hwang's scheme [9] is not free from this kind of impersonation attack, a brief description of which is given now.
Step 1. Client C sends the authentication message (id, {r c , pw}K s ) to S.
Step 2. The server S, on receiving the client C 's authentication message (id, {r c , pw}K s ), S decrypts {r c , pw}K s with its own private key and gets C 's original password pw.
Step 3. If S is not trusted, then C 's password pw may be compromised with an attacker A who may try to impersonate C to login with S as described below: In addition, if the private key of S is leaked accidentally to an adversary A, he can impersonate the client C after reveling the C 's password pw from the eavesdropped message (id, {r c , pw}K s ) sent by C to S during password authentication phase.
Thus the Lin-Hwang's scheme fails to protect this kind of impersonation attack. For clarity, the details of this attack are given in Fig. 3 .
Many logged-in users' attack
The many logged-in users' attack is defined as the simultaneous access of a legitimate client's account in a remote server by multiple adversaries using the same identity and password of the client. In Lin-Hwang's scheme [9] , the remote server S stores identity, password-verifier pair (id, H(pw)) of the client C to the database. Assume C 's legitimate id and pw is accidentally exposed to the many adversaries A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A m , then all who knows id and pw, can login to the remote server S, at the same time by executing the following steps:
Step This attack in Lin-Hwang's scheme is further illustrated using a flow chart as given in Fig. 4 .
Known session-specific temporary information attack
The detailed explanation about the known session-specific temporary information attack is given in [38] [39] [40] . Cheng et al. [41] , Mandt and Tan [42] argued that if the session ephemeral secrets are exposed to an adversary A accidentally, then some authentication mechanism must be incorporated in the session key distribution protocol such that this exposure should not compromise the resulting session key. According to the above discussions, we pointed out that Lin-Hwang's scheme cannot resist the known session-specific temporary information attack. For instance, in Lin and Hwang's scheme, two ephemeral secrets x and y are selected by the client C and server S in each session respectively and compute the session
xy . Now if these two ephemeral secrets x and y are compromised to A by some means, then A can easily compute the session key using
xy . Hence, the Lin and Hwang's scheme fails to prevent the known session-specific temporary information attack. Further, we explain this attack in Fig. 5 .
Proposed ECC-based scheme
In this section, we proposed an elliptic curve cryptosystem based improve remote login scheme which provides the missing security provisions of Lin and Hwang's scheme. The following notations are used through out the proposed scheme ( Table 2) .
The proposed scheme consists of four phases-Registration phase, Password authentication phase, Password change phase and Session key distribution phase. Now each of these phases is discussed below.
Registration phase
Initially, a client A must register to the server S with his own identity ID A and password-verifier U A and collects the server's public key U S , then server stores each legal client's identity, password-verifier, and a status-bit in a write protected file as depicted in the Table 3 , where the status-bit indicates the status of the client, i.e., when the client is logged-in to the server the status-bit is set to one, otherwise it is set to zero.
Password authentication phase
The password authentication protocol consists of following four steps:
Step 1. Client → Server: 
Step 2. Server → Client:
The server computes the decryption key K x by calculating Step 4. Server → Client: Access Granted/Denied.
The server computes the hash value with own copies of W S and W A which is received from the client in step 2 and compares it with received H(W A , W S ), to accept or denied the login request. If all of the conditions are satisfied then the server granted the client's login request, otherwise rejects the client login request.
Password change phase
Step 
Session key distribution phase
Step Now, we illustrate the proposed ECC-based scheme in Fig. 6 .
Correctness of the proposed scheme
All the proposed methods as given above followed a bilinear pairing that assures the correctness of the scheme. The proof of the bilinear pairing used, is given below. In order to proofê(
Security and efficiency analysis of the proposed scheme
In this section, the security analysis of the proposed scheme is given for the validation of our claim. Furthermore, the comparison of the proposed scheme with other related schemes is given for the performance study of our scheme.
Security analysis
The proposed scheme is free from all known cryptographic attacks and provides several security attributes as described below. ) - Fig. 6 . The proposed ECC-based remote login scheme. 
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= pw A · U S = d S · U A = (K x , K y ),
S2: Password guessing attack
The password guessing attack is an important issue in any password-based remote user authentication scheme. In practice, the client tries to use the weak password (low intensity) for easy memorization. The weak password can be easily guessed by the adversary and using that password an adversary may impersonate the legal client. In the proposed protocol, the server stores the password-verifier U A = pw A · G to a write protected file and the adversary cannot extract the password pw A from U A as he has to solve the ECDLP [30] , thus the password guessing attack is infeasible to the proposed scheme.
S3: Impersonation attack
Assume that an adversary makes an effort to impersonate the server to exchange a session key with the legal client. Accordingly the impersonation attack is infeasible in the proposed scheme.
S4: Denial of service attack
The server closes a login session if the number of login attempts of an account by an incorrect password exceeds a limit value. Even so, such a client's account is still workable and later login requests will pass as long as correct password is provided. In Step 3 of the proposed password change protocol, suppose the adversary replaces ( ). But they are different, and therefore, the server rejects the password change protocol with a failure message to the client. Therefore, the proposed protocol has the capability to detect the denial of service attack.
S5: Many logged-in users' attack
The proposed protocol can withstand the many logged-in users' attack. Let us assume that the password pw A and the login-id ID A of a legal client A, are leaked to more than one adversary. But in the proposed scheme only one adversary can login the remote server at the same time out of all who know the valid password pw A and login-id ID A . When an adversary logged-in by using the valid password pw A and login-id ID A , then the server sets the status-bit to one and meanwhile if other adversaries try to login the server at the same time with same password pw A and login-id ID A , the server denies all the requests because the status-bit indicates still someone is logged in.
S6: Server spoofing attack
Server spoofing attack means, an adversary may try to masquerade as a server to know the client's long-term secret. The long-term secret is the client's password and server's private key. The symmetric key
cannot be computed without server's secret key d S or password pw A of the client A. In Step 1 of password authentication protocol, an adversary cannot obtains W A by decrypting (ID A , E Kx (ID A , R A , W A )) with a wrong key, then the adversary cannot get success in Step 2. By chance if the adversary knows the value of W A , but from it password extraction is impossible due to difficulties of ECDLP. Therefore, an adversary cannot get success in the proposed protocol by server spoofing attack.
S7: Perfect forward secrecy
Perfect forward secrecy means, if the private key of the server and the password of the client are compromised then the secrecy of previously established session keys should not be affected. Assume that the client's password pw A and server's secret key d S are known to an adversary. The adversary can compute 
To know the session key SK , the adversary tries to compute it from the pair
directly, but it is impossible due to difficulties of computational Diffie-Hellman problem. In other words, if the current session key is leaked but from this disclosure the adversary is unable to draw all the past session keys, because the session key depends on random numbers r A and r S . Hence the proposed protocol provides perfect forward security in the key distribution protocol.
S8: Insider attack
By stealing the password-verifier from the server's verifier table, a privileged-insider of the server can access the other servers (where the client is registered with same identity and password) by making a valid login request. The proposed
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Table 4
Security comparisons of the proposed scheme with other remote login schemes. S1  S2  S3  S4  S5  S6  S7  S8  S9 Peyravian-Zunic [2] Yes No [3] No [7] No [43] No No [7] No -Hwang-Yeh [7] No [8] No [13] No [13] No [9] No Yes No [9] No No Lin-Hwang [9] Yes scheme maintains a password-verifier table, which contains client's identity ID A and password-verifier U A = pw A · G. Now it is computationally impossible to extract the password pw A from the verifier U A due to difficulties of ECDLP and hence the adversary who steals U A , cannot generate the symmetric key K x . Thus the privileged-insider may not impersonate the legitimate client as he is unable to authenticate himself to the remote server without K x and therefore, the insider attack is infeasible to the proposed scheme.
Security attributes/Schemes
S9: Known session-specific temporary information attack
In our proposed scheme, after the successful password authentication, the client and the server computes the session
Suppose that the ephemeral secrets r A and r S are exposed to an adversary. However, it is impossible derive the session key SK with the knowledge of r A and r S . Since the session key SK not only contains r A and r S but also contains the client's password pw A and server's secret key d S . Therefore, to compute the session key the adversary
the CDHP, which is hard to solve by a polynomial time algorithm. Thus the known session-specific temporary information attack is not possible in the proposed scheme. The Table 4 sums up certain cryptographic security attributes of the proposed scheme and some relevant schemes [2, 7, 9, 13] , where it shows that our scheme prevents all related cryptographic attacks.
• Impersonation attack in Zhu's scheme In Zhu's scheme [13] , the client makes the registration request to the remote server with the identity id and H(pw, s), where s is the salt generated by the client. Hence there is a possibility to compromise H(pw, s) with an outsider if the server is not trusted. , s) ) stored on server's database. Therefore, the outsider successfully impersonates a legitimate client to login with remote server.
• Many logged-in users' attack in Peyravian-Zunic's and Hwang-Yeh's schemes
The Peyravian-Zunic's [2] and Hwang-Yeh's [7] schemes do not prevent the many logged-in users' attack. In Peyravian-Zunic's scheme [2] , the server stores (id, H(id, pw)) in the database for a client having identity id and password pw. If client's id and pw are leaked to multiple adversaries, then all who know id and pw follow the protected password transmission protocol of Peyravian-Zunic's scheme and can access the client's account concurrently to the same server in the same way as described in Section 4.4. Both the Hwang-Yeh's scheme [7] and Lin-Hwang's scheme [9] follow the same client registration and password authentication procedures and since, as shown in Section 4.4, the Lin-Hwang's scheme cannot resist the many logged-in users' attack, thus the Hwang-Yah's scheme is also vulnerable to this attack.
• Insider attack in Peyravian-Zunic's and Hwang-Yeh's schemes
In practice, a client may register with a number of servers using same password pw and identity id. In Peyravian-Zunic's scheme [2] , the server maintains a record (id, H(id, pw)) against the client in a database. Now a privileged-insider of a remote server steals H(id, pw) and executes an off-line password guessing attack on it. Therefore, the privileged-insider gets exact password pw and accesses other servers where the client is registered as a legal client. So, the Peyravian-Zunic's scheme is vulnerable to the insider attack. The Hwang-Yeh's scheme [7] is also susceptible to the insider attack. In the scheme, the server stores (id, H(pw)), and a privileged-insider upon stealing H(pw), applies an off-line password guessing attack on H(pw) and can guess the exact password pw.
• Known session-specific temporary information attack in Hwang-Yeh's scheme In Hwang-Yah's scheme [7] , the client and the server, after the successful password authentication, compute the session key by applying some mutually agreed function to session ephemeral secrets r c and r s . If these two secrets r c and r s are leaked to an adversary by some means, then the resulting session key will be compromised. Therefore, the known session-specific temporary information attack is possible in Hwang-Yah's scheme.
Efficiency analysis
In this subsection, we summarize the following functional requirements which help to evaluate the efficiency of a remote user authentication scheme. Each of these constraints is very crucial requirements for an efficient remote login scheme over the unreliable networks. 
E1: Mutual authentication
Client authentication may satisfy the necessary security requirements in the simple password-based remote login system. However, in many situations where the highly confidential data are exchanged between client and server, which means server authentication is also necessary to which client confidently communicates with the trusted server. Which indicates a mutual authentication is needed between client and server. The proposed scheme provides such requirements using three-way challenge-response handshake technique.
E2: Choosing friendly password by the client
Client can choose their password freely without any assistance from the remote server. In the proposed scheme an easyto-remember (low intensity) password pw is chosen by the client and the password-verifier U = pwG is stored to the server's database and from it pw cannot be derived due to the difficulty of ECDLP.
E3: Session key agreement
The proposed scheme supports the session key agreement technique, which helps to establish common and secure session key between the client and the server in each session. With this session key, the client and the remote server can exchange highly confidential data between them securely.
E4: Secure password change scheme
A legitimate client can change their password after the registration phase. The proposed scheme has a secure (without DoS attack) password change scheme, i.e., the remote user can change/update their password any time.
E5: Clock synchronization problem
The problem of clock synchronization arises due to the time stamp used in a remote login system. Discard the timestamp to avoid this problem. The Zhu et al.'s [13] scheme used the timestamp to provide the security against the replay attack. However, the time stamp causes the clock synchronization problem, especially in the wide area network. It is better to include some self-verified mechanism in the protocol which can detect the replay attack. Accordingly, the proposed scheme and [2, 7, 9] passes up the usage of time stamp and prevents the clock synchronization problem by applying three-way challenge-response technique.
E6: Extra hardware device
The scheme [13] prevents the off-line password guessing attack by employing the salting technique. To protect the salt an extra hardware device, named trusted platform module (TPM) [14] is used. The salt file is encrypted by the Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) or a storage key which is encrypted by the RTS, and stored on the hard disk of the client's system. The usage of TPM puts an extra burden trouble on the client. However, the proposed scheme and [2, 7, 9] provides fully software-based solution; no extra hardware device is needed.
E7: Bandwidth requirements
The proposed scheme is implemented with ECC, and the symmetric key encryption/decryption technique is used, whereas other schemes [7, 9, 13] used the public key encryption/decryption. As the symmetric key encryption is faster and produces the cipher text of fewer bits than any public key encryption [30] . Thus the length of the transmitted message in
Step 1 of the proposed scheme is smaller than others [7, 9, 13] . Consequently, the bandwidth requirement of the proposed scheme is smaller than Hwang-Yeh, Lin-Hwang and Zhu et al.'s scheme.
We provide a comparative study of different functional requirements of some existing schemes [2, 7, 9, 13] with the proposed scheme, as shown in Table 5 . Note that our scheme satisfies all above-mentioned requirements.
The key distribution protocol of Lin and Hwang's scheme uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm [44] and since the random challenges g x and g y requires executing modular exponential (MEXP), which is an expensive operation and the Lin and Hwang's scheme applies public key encryption/decryption technique. The public key encryption/decryption is slower operation compared with symmetric key operation and the computation cost of elliptic curve point multiplication is much less than that of modular exponentiation [45] . This is because 160-bit ECDLP and 1024-bit discrete logarithm problem (DLP) have the same security level [30] . Therefore, the Lin and Hwang's scheme has high computation cost. The proposed protocol reduces the communication, computation and storage space costs as the ECC and symmetric key encryption/decryption are used. It is to be noted that the proposed scheme uses the general cryptographic hash function and instead the XOR operation, elliptic curve multiplication/addition (EPM/EAD) is used, which is quite slower than XOR operation, but instead public key encryption (having slower processing speed) the symmetric key encryption (faster) is used. Therefore, overall computation cost of the proposed scheme is lower than others [7, 9, 13] . A comparative study in terms of the different
